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Agricultural Globalization in Reverse: The Impact of the Food Crisis in West 
Africa 
 
Background and objectives 
Trade bans and high international food prices are pushing many West African countries 
away from their historical reliance on regional and international trade as a key 
component of their food security strategies.  No longer confident that international and 
regional markets are reliable sources of basic staples, many countries are pushing for 
greater food self sufficiency—a sort of agricultural globalization in reverse.  This paper 
examines West Africa’s globalization in reverse and raises a number of questions about 
what role regional and international trade should play in the region’s future quest for 
food security. The objective is to stimulate discussion about the different strategies 
available to West African governments for ensuring food security in the current 
environment of high world market prices for staple foods.  These strategies need to take 
into account not only the need to provide safety nets for vulnerable groups who cannot 
afford the higher food costs but also the need to stimulate production in response to 
growing regional and world demand. 
 
Evolution of food security policies in West Africa 
West Africa has historically relied on international and regional trade to help assure its 
food security. Although some governments in the sub-region promoted national food 
self-sufficiency in the 1980s, by the early 1990s, most West African countries had 
adopted a broader notion of food security that built upon historical regional and 
international trade patterns based on comparative advantage. Countries in the sub-
region fall into four categories regarding the role of trade in their food-security 
strategies: 
 Countries such as Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone that have historically based 
their food strategies on large imports of Asian rice combined with imports of coarse 
grains (millet, maize and sorghum) from neighboring countries, while exporting cash 
crops and mineral resources; 
 Those that were food exporters in the 1960s (most notably Nigeria), but have become 
major importers of rice, wheat, and some coarse grains, as their economies and 
population have grown faster than domestic agricultural output; 
 Those that have historically been largely self-sufficient or exporters of staples in 
normal years (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad) and 
 Those (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea) that import significant quantities of rice 
from overseas and millet from northern neighbors, but that seasonally export 




In reality, most countries, even significant exporters and importers, are involved in some 
two-way regional trade in staples. For example, Nigeria exports significant quantities of 
                                                 
1 Just because a country exports staples to its neighbors does not imply that it is food secure in the sense 
of guaranteeing everyone in the country access to a reliable source of food.  Indeed, as discussed below, 
it is the desire to protect the poor’s access to food that has led some governments in the region to restrict 
exports.   3
coarse grains to Niger in exchange for cowpeas, while Mali and Burkina Faso import 
some rice from Asia while exporting coarse grains to their neighbors. 
 
Since the mid-1970s, the countries of West Africa have been linked through a number 
of trade and monetary organizations, the most important being: 
 
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975 and 
comprising 15 countries,
2 with a mission to promote economic integration in all fields 
of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and 
social and cultural matters.  The ECOWAS treaty authorizes free movement of goods 
and people among the member states. 
 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA),  which includes  8 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo) that share a common currency, the CFA franc.  UEMOA, formed in 1994 
by enlarging the scope of activities of the previous West African Monetary Union 
(UMOA), has as its mission to strengthen the competitiveness of economic and 
financial activities of member states within the framework of open and competitive 
markets and to create a common market based on the free circulation of people, 
goods, services, and capital, as well as on common exterior tariffs and commercial 
policies.   
 
In addition, two regional organizations play a particularly important role in the 
coordination of agricultural policies and trade in West Africa.  The Council of Ministers of 
Agriculture of West and Central Africa (CMA/WCA), created in 1991 and including 20 
countries,
3 has as its objectives the promotion of regional agricultural trade, the 
improvement of West and Central Africa’s competitiveness in international agricultural 
markets, and the promotion of sustainable agricultural development through the 
harmonization of agricultural policies in the region.  The Permanent Interstate 
Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), which includes 9 countries
4, was 
created in 1973 as a regional effort to promote food security and combat drought and 
desertification through promoting regional scientific cooperation, policy coordination, 
and capacity building.  Since the 1970s, CILSS has provided both empirical research 
and forums for policy discussion to promote regional agricultural trade throughout West 
Africa and has recently been mandated by ECOWAS to help lead the effort for the 
entire ECOWAS community.  
 
Thus, over 35 years, West Africa has built up an institutional framework that promotes 
regional agricultural trade and cooperation as central components of national food 
security strategies.  This long history of institutional cooperation makes the current shift 
                                                 
2 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
3 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,  and Togo in West Africa and Cameroon, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon in Central Africa. 
4 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal 
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away from trade in response to the current food crisis –“agricultural globalization in 
reverse”— all the more striking. 
 
The current food crisis has shifted the West African trade-based food-security strategy 
into reverse for several reasons. Soaring prices (e.g., rice selling for over US$1000/ton) 
and export bans from some Asian countries such as India not only threatened the 
availability of rice imports, but led many West African governments to conclude that the 
risks were very high in depending on the international market for staples. At the same 
time, some West African exporters of coarse grains (millet, sorghum, and maize)—most 
notably Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria— restricted exports in an attempt to pro-
tect domestic consumers from the soaring prices. This in turn has driven up costs in 
neighboring countries, while depressing prices paid to their own farmers, and having 
only mixed effects on reducing consumer prices (for details, see Kelly et al. 2008; and 
Diarra and Dembélé, 2008).  
 
The recent staple food price situation in West Africa 
Cereal supply in West Africa for 2007/08 was about 5% below the excellent 2006/07 
harvest.
5  Sahelian countries did better than coastal ones, with aggregate 2007/08 
production in the Sahelian countries 1% below the previous year but 17% above 
average levels for 2002-2006. Nevertheless, there were important pockets of poor 
production in a number of Sahelian countries (e.g., in Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger). Among coastal countries, four experienced production declines from 
the previous year (Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria) ranging from 7% in 
Nigeria—by far the largest grain producer in West Africa— to 13% in Ghana, while 
production in Togo and Sierra Leone increased by 3% and 21%, respectively. Various 
reconnaissance missions and market information reports confirm that initial responses 
to these various production shortfalls by the private sector were positive, with new trade 
routes being developed and the relative importance of existing routes changing in 
response to the emerging demand.
6  Most analysts agree that this relatively small 
decline in aggregate regional production and the demonstrated ability of the private 
sector to respond would not, under historical circumstances, have resulted in the cereal 
price hikes that have been experienced during 2007 and 2008. Thus, it was the 
combination of slightly lower production in West Africa, higher regional demand, and 
much higher world prices that resulted in the current high-price situation in West Africa.
7 
 
Demand for cereals is growing in the region not only as a result of population growth 
and urbanization but also because as incomes rise, consumers demand more products 
                                                 
5 All production data come from presentations made by CILSS at the CILSS Market and Trade 
Opportunity Conference, Cotonou, April 2008.  More details are available in Kelly et al. 2008.   
6 See, for example, the discussion in SIMA (2008) and Diarra and Dembélé (2008) about the emergence 
since 1999 of the new “Kantchari (Burkina Faso) trade corridor” linking producers in Mali and Burkina 
Faso with growing markets in Niger, northern Nigeria and northern Benin. 
7 For a discussion of the many factors contributing to the high world prices, see the websites on this topic 
developed by the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/foodprices/), the 
IMF(https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/NEW042808A.htm#top),the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (http://www.ifpri.org/themes/foodprices/foodprices.asp) and Michigan State 
University (http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/responses/index.htm).    5
that require cereals as intermediate inputs (e.g., dairy products, meat, poultry, and 
alcoholic beverages). Nigeria, for example, had a significant increase in demand for 
maize in 2007/08 as its poultry industry recovered from a downturn associated with 
avian flu. There is evidence that demand for poultry and livestock feed is also growing in 
Mali, although at a slower rate than in Nigeria. It is not clear that government estimates 
of cereal needs using traditional “cereals balance” methods are fully accounting for the 
growth in such intermediate demand.  
 
Generalized inflation is an additional factor contributing to political unrest surrounding 
rising food prices and concerns about food security. For UEMOA countries, overall 
prices were 7% higher in May 2008 than a year earlier. This is in contrast to historical 
patterns of moderate inflation (less than 4%/year) since the late 1990s. Outside the CFA 
franc zone, inflation in Nigeria and Ghana was higher (5% and 11%, respectively) in 
2007, but lower than 1999-2006 rates, which went as high as 19% (Nigeria) and 33% 
(Ghana) during peak years. The range of products whose price increases have raised 
consumer concerns is very broad. For example, higher energy prices translate into 
higher transport costs for food and costs of getting to and from work, school, and 
markets; transport price hikes can also cut into profit margins, reducing the net incomes 
of artisans, traders, and transporters. Lodging costs and prices of basic household 
goods are also rising, leaving less money for food.  
 
Food price inflation, of course, is an important component of generalized inflation; for 
UEMOA countries, food prices increased 14.2% from May 2007 to May 2008. Products 
such as milk, meat, fish, and cooking oil are frequently cited as major culprits. The 
degree to which staple food prices are rising varies by country, by product, and by 
source (regional or world markets). Yet it is important to note that for most countries, 
cereal prices, even in nominal terms are not at historical highs (particularly for coarse 
grains).  Prices for coarse grains were higher during the crisis year of 2004/05, when 
droughts and locust attacks created a supply shortfall, although rice prices are now at or 
above the 2004/05 levels.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the long-term price patterns for 
Dakar and Bamako.  As recently as July 2008, FEWSNET reported that millet and 
sorghum prices in northern Nigeria were still slightly below their 2004/05 levels, 
although they were substantially above prices following the good 2006/07 harvest.
 8  
Thus, it is not high food prices alone, but rather the combination of higher food prices in 
conjunction with broader generalized inflation, that is leading to consumer unrest.   
 
                                                 
8 For more details on coarse grain prices see Kelly et al., 2008 and (http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications 
/nigeria_2008_07_final.pdf)   6


































Source: Graph prepared by authors using data from SIM/Senegal and Afrique Verte bulletins  
 
































Source: Graph prepared by authors using data from OMA and AfriqueVerte bulletins  
 
Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate that while rice prices have climbed significantly, locally 
produced coarse grain prices have not, until very recently, shown a similar price 
increases.   In West Africa, it is important to distinguish between staples such as rice 
and wheat, which are internationally traded, and those that are not as widely traded 
internationally but are important in regional markets (often referred to as “semi-  7
tradables”).
9  The latter include millet, sorghum, fonio, cassava and yams.  Maize is an 
intermediate case.  Historically, relatively little maize has been traded in or out of West 
Africa, although this situation is beginning to change, particularly with the increasing 
demand for feedgrains for the growing poultry industry.  Over the past 40 years, West 
African consumers, particularly in urban areas, have shifted their consumption 
increasingly towards rice and wheat products, in part because they are easier to 
prepare and consume in time-constrained urban settings. The current high international 
prices of rice and wheat have been quickly transmitted to West African consumers as 
illustrated by Figure 3, which shows how prices of domestically produced rice closely 
track those of imported rice in Mali. A key empirical question is the degree to which the 
higher prices of wheat and rice will spill over onto the semi-tradables, driving up their 
prices as consumers shift consumption to these cheaper locally produced staples.   
Beginning in April-June, coarse grain prices in Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Niger, 
which had been relatively stable earlier in the year, began to rise, suggesting that 
consumers had begun to overcome their historical reluctance to substitute coarse grains 
for the easier-to-prepare rice and wheat products (Figures 1 and 2).
10 
 
Imported rice, and to a lesser extent wheat used in bread, are the biggest problems for 
import-dependent countries such as Senegal; but imported rice prices are also rising in 
countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, which are less reliant on imports.  Maize is a 
problem for countries with production shortfalls (e.g., Nigeria and Ghana) and their 
neighbors (Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali), whose markets are being used to help fill the 
shortfalls (Figure 4).    
 




































Local Rice Imported Rice
 
Source: Graph prepared by authors using data from Afrique Verte bulletins. The vertical line indicates 
that monthly, as opposed to annual data, are graphed starting in January 2007. 
 
                                                 
9 See Delgado et al. (1994) for more a discussion of the importance of these “semi-tradables” in 
agricultural development in West Africa. 
10 See Camara 2004 and Reardon et al., for past evidence on substitution of cereals by West African 
consumers.   8
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Source: Graph complied by authors from data in Afrique Verte Bulletins. 
 
Short-run policy responses and emerging picture of impacts  
Table 1, adapted from a recent paper by the World Bank (April 2008), presents a set of 
policy options for dealing with rising food prices. Four options fall into the category of 
safety-net programs, and six can reduce food prices in general. The table evaluates 
each policy option in terms of how well it targets vulnerable groups and preserves 
incentives for beneficiaries to work or produce more staples as well as in terms of costs 
and ease of implementation and management. As the focus of this paper is the 
relationship between trade policies and rising prices, the policy tools of most interest are 
those in the “price reducing” column, such as tariff adjustments and export bans, 
although subsidies and stock releases implemented at the national level will also 
influence both domestic and regional trade decisions made by private-sector actors. 
The World Bank judged that reducing tariffs and taxes can be more effective (four of five 
effectiveness criteria are applicable) than export restrictions (only one applicable 
effectiveness criterion), with subsidies and stock releases falling in the middle (2-3 
relevant criteria).  
   9
 
Table 1. Effectiveness of Policies for Mitigating High Food Prices 
Price Reducing Tools*  Safety-net Tools* 
• Reducing Tariffs/VAT (2, 3, 4, 5) 
• Subsidies/rations 
– Generalized (3, 4) 
– Targeted (1, 2, 3) 
• Release stocks (2, 4) 
• Export restrictions (4) 
• Producer price controls (0) 
 
• Targeted cash transfers (1, 2, 3, 5) 
• Food for work (1, 2, 3) 
• Food aid (1, 3, 4) 
• Feeding/nutrition program (2, 3) 
 
 
* Numbers following each tool refer to the following “effectiveness criteria”: 
1. Targets  vulnerable 
2. Preserves  incentives 
3. Costs  contained 
4.  Easy to implement 
5.  Limited management and governance concerns 
 
 
Policy instruments used by West African countries to deal with the high food 
prices fall primarily in the category of those that are “easy to implement,” 
although perhaps difficult to enforce (a criterion not listed in the table). Those 
relating to regional trade include tariff relief policies implemented by Niger, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Cameroon, and Nigeria and export restrictions 
imposed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—all countries whose production this 
year has matched historical norms.  
 
Tariff relief. A disadvantage of reducing tariffs on imported staples is that unless 
the reduction is implemented well in advance of a crisis situation, it is unlikely to 
have the desired impact because traders are usually unwilling to reduce prices of 
currently held stocks for which the taxes have already been paid. Response also 
tends to be slow when import markets are dominated by a few large players who 
face few competitive pressures to pass on cost savings to consumers—a 
situation that is common in the region. Furthermore, when implemented in the 
context of rapidly rising prices, even if wholesalers do pass on the cost savings, 
consumers may not perceive lower prices because the importers’ purchase price 
may have risen by more than the tax reduction.  Or if the importers agree to a 
fixed selling price in exchange for a tax holiday, they may not be able to honor 
the agreement if the world prices (and hence the prices they pay) rise rapidly 
after the agreement with the government is signed.  A recent news item (IRIN 29 
April) reported that prices of rice, flour, and fish were still at their previous levels 
or higher almost two months after the government of Cameroon lifted import 
taxes. The government received agreement from wholesalers that they would 
pass on the 5 percent reduction in price to buyers, but the impact had not yet 
filtered down through retailers.  A second drawback of the tax holiday on imports 
is that it reduces government revenues that could be used to support measures   10
to expand domestic production.
11 For example, Cameroon is currently 
considering reinstating its import tax on staples and using the revenues to 
subsidize local production.  In Mali, where the government has just announced a 
major new rice production program, funding is constrained by limited resources 
because of the reduced cereal and fuel import tax revenues.   
 
Export restrictions. While there is some evidence that immediately following the 
introduction of export restrictions, regional trade was reduced, recent 
reconnaissance missions in Mali and Niger (Diarra and Dembélé 2008; SIMA 
2008) suggest that trade picked up again and that the main impact of the export 
bans has been increased transactions costs associated with moving supplies 
from surplus to deficit zones—costs that are ultimately borne by the consumers 
in the importing countries and by farmers in the exporting countries, reducing the 
latter’s incentives to invest in agriculture and expand production.   
 
In essence, export bans in West Africa act like very badly designed and poorly 
implemented export taxes.  Like export taxes, they depress producer incentives 
in low-cost, more efficient producing countries (e.g., Mali and Burkina Faso) and 
raise producer prices in higher-cost importing countries. They therefore 
encourage staple food production in areas where such production is more costly 
while discouraging it in areas that currently have a comparative advantage. This 
shift in incentives leads to resource misallocation within the region, raising the 
costs of achieving regional food security.  Unlike a fixed export tax, however, the 
level of illicit payments needed to evade an export ban can vary widely, 
increasing the risk that traders face and reducing their ability to plan.   
Furthermore, the revenues generated by these illicit taxes flow into the pockets of 
private individuals who control access to the border crossings (customs and 
police officers, etc.), rather than into government coffers, where they could be 
used to invest in increasing agricultural productivity. 
 
The reconnaissance missions confirmed that cereal flows from Mali to Mauritania 
continued  briefly after Mali’s export ban was announced (local authorities 
permitted traders to export existing stocks) but then stopped due both to stricter 
enforcement and the implementation of import subsidies in Mauritania that made 
imported wheat products and rice less expensive than Malian coarse grains. The 
Niono/Nara to Mauritania trading axis had an overall decline in millet exports of 
38% from 2007 to 2008. A similar decline in millet exports was observed between 
Sikasso (Mali) and Côte d’Ivoire (27%). The situation was reversed, however, for 
millet moving from Sikasso to Niger (174% increase) and for maize along several 
other market axes, in spite of the export ban. The volume of maize shipped from 
the Sikasso region to Senegal increased from 1880 tons (January to July 2007) 
                                                 
11 Loans available to government through the IMF’s “Exogenous Shock Facility” may help them to 
continue to make these key investments in spite of the budgetary shortfalls brought about by the 
tax reductions.    11
to 6047 tons during the same period in 2008.
12 Along the Kantchari-Niamey axis 
between Burkina Faso
13 and Niger, maize exports grew from 8384 tons in 2007 
(January – July) to 10,870 tons in 2008, in spite of Burkina’s and Mali’s export 
bans.  Much of this increased trade seems to have been destined ultimately for 
northern Nigeria and Northern Benin, which in normal years export coarse grains 
to Niger.  This year, because of poor harvests, they are importing, drawing grain 
from as far away as Mali. 
 
For maize, the Malian trade restrictions, officially introduced in February 2008, 
were followed by rising, rather than falling, wholesale and retail prices in Koutiala, 
the heart of Mali’s maize production zone, in response to the increased export 
demand (Table 2).  
 
Table 2.  Evolution of wholesale and retail prices of  maize in Koutiala, Mali: 
2007 and 2008 
Month  2006/07  2007/08  % Variation 2007 to 
2008 
 Wholesale  Retail  Wholesale Retail  Wholesale  Retail 
January 70  75  98  103  40  37 
February 75  80  97  105  29  31 
March 75  80  101  106  35  33 
April   75  80  106  112  41  40 
May 76  81 118  124  55  55 
June 78  83 137  143  76  72 
Source:  Diarra and Dembélé 2008. 
 
 
Interviews with traders also revealed a significant increase in transaction costs 
for exports from Mali to Senegal and Niger (estimates ranging from 250,000 to 
440,000 CFA francs per truck load of 60 to 80 tons of cereal—an eight-fold 
increase in illicit payments relative to the period prior to the export bans).  An 
analysis of the differences between wholesale maize prices in Koutiala and 
destination markets in Senegal and Niger in late August, 2008, however, 
revealed a large increase in the price differential between these markets, 
suggesting that the trade restrictions, while not stopping trade, had reduced the 
degree of market integration in the region (see figure 5).
14  Dakar prices were 95 
CFA francs higher per kilogram and Niamey prices 86 CFA francs higher than in 
Koutiala. Estimated transport and transaction costs (excluding those associated 
                                                 
12 Improvements in the road infrastructure between Mali and Senegal in 2007/08 undoubtedly 
accounted for some of the increase, but it is striking to see such a rise in exports at a time when 
the Malian government was trying to restrict them. 
13 The Burkina market is fed by supplies from Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, depending on 
production patterns in a given year. 
14 The price differentials shown in figure 5 are smaller than the differentials mentioned in the text.  
The figures cited in the text refer to a slightly later period (late August 2008) and to differences in 
wholesale rather than retail prices.  Nonetheless, the story from figure 5 is clear: spatial price 
differentials have widened sharply since the imposition of the trade restrictions.   12
with circumventing the export restrictions) range from 26 to 28 CFA francs/kg, 
leaving about 60 CFA francs/kg in Niger and 67 in Senegal to cover importer and 
retailer margins plus “circumvention” costs. So long as the price differences 
between markets are high, trade restrictions are unlikely to stop cereal flows from 
surplus to deficit markets. In this example, it is Malian producers and Senegalese 
and Nigerien consumers who are being penalized by the trade bans while those 
collecting the illicit taxes are benefiting.  The result is lower incentives in the 
system for stimulating production to reduce ongoing food insecurity. 
 






















Source: Graph prepared by authors using data from OMA and AfriqueVerte bulletins
 
 
Four emerging strategies 
  Four major strategies have emerged or have been advocated as means of 
dealing with the food crisis in the short run while stimulating agricultural growth in 
the long run. Below, we briefly discuss the main advantages and disadvantages 
of each approach. 
 
1.  An emphasis on national self-sufficiency 
During the mid to late 1980s, most West African countries, especially the 
francophone countries, shifted from a policy advocating national food self 
sufficiency to one of food security, based on a combination of national production 
and trade, particularly regional trade that takes account of the complementarity of 
resources within the subregion.  This move away from an autarkic approach to 
food security was initially strongly pushed by external donors as part of structural 
adjustment packages, but later was adopted as a central element of the 
strategies advocated by regional organizations such as ECOWAS, UEMOA, 
CMA/WCA and CILSS.   
 
The current crisis, with its trade bans both in West Africa and from Asian rice 
exporters, has raised the risks of such a trade-based approach and led some 
countries to aim for greater national self-sufficiency in basic staples.  The most 
striking example is Senegal’s “Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food and   13
Abundance” (GOANA—Grande offensive agricole pour la nourriture et 
l'abondance), that seeks to move Senegal from 20% rice self-sufficiency to 100% 
by 2015.   
 
A key advantage of a national self-sufficiency strategy, if it succeeds, is that it 
makes the country less dependent on the vagaries of other countries’ export 
policies for politically important basic staples.  Such a strategy also focuses 
attention on the agricultural sector and may reverse the historical 
underinvestment in agricultural production in most African countries. In addition, 
if agriculture is the main provider of employment and source of income for the 
majority of people, then such policies can promote overall development if they 
spur increased productive investment in agriculture that allows the country to 
achieve lower unit costs of production. This is more likely to be achieved if the 
country focuses on long-term investment in the key drivers of agricultural 
development rather than just short-term production subsidies.  
 
The costs of such a strategy depend critically upon: 
  The degree to which domestic production can be increased through 
increased  productivity (driving down the unit cost of production) vs. 
expanding production through the increasingly costly application of more 
inputs using the same low-productivity technologies.  For example, if 
production is expanded through the use of subsidized inputs, will those 
subsidies lead to adoption of new technologies (e.g., more fertilizer-
responsive varieties) that eventually drive down unit costs of production?  
Or will the subsidies have to continue (and be financed) indefinitely as 
farmers apply the subsidized inputs in their current production systems? 
  How stable domestic production will be relative to world market supplies.  
A traditional justification for trade is that it acts to stabilize domestic 
supplies, as global or regional production is likely to be more stable than 
the production in a single country. 
 
The traditional arguments against an autarkic staple food policy are twofold. First, 
if the country’s unit cost of production is significantly higher than the price at 
which staples can be imported, then either consumers (through higher prices) or 
taxpayers (through taxes that pay for production subsidies) will bear the higher-
cost local production. Those resources, the argument goes, could yield higher 
returns to the country if they were invested in other sectors of the economy and 
the revenues thus generated were used to import food.  If the production is 
expanded by subsidies (e.g., for fertilizer), the critical issue is the opportunity cost 
of the resources going into the subsidy.  They likely could have created greater 
wealth for the economy in other uses; otherwise, they would have flowed into 
staple food production without government action. Second, as mentioned above, 
trade can be used as a stabilizer of domestic markets because global production 
is generally more stable than production in an individual country. But to use trade 
in this way, there must be some trade infrastructure in place and links with 
reliable trading partners, neither of which are likely to emerge if a country   14
pursues an autarkic food policy.  Furthermore, if the country has a surplus, 
without ongoing trade relations with its neighbors, it may find it harder to find 
customers for its surplus, leading to more volatile domestic prices. 
 
Yet the recent export bans by countries such as India, Vietnam, Mali, and 
Burkina Faso bring both of these arguments against autarky into question.  Even 
though the import bans have not really completely cut any country off from 
foreign supplies, the importing countries have reason to question whether a 
trade-based food security policy is too risky.  If export bans result in staples not 
being available at any price, then the advantages of a trade-based policy 
disappear.  
 
2.  Regional trade zone with protection against outside imports 
ECOWAS is premised on the notion of the free movement of goods and people 
within member states, while offering some degree of protection from outside 
imports. In this sense, it has followed, in principle, the model of most free-trade 
areas, with the well-known effects of trade creation (expanding trade within the 
community) and trade diversion (reducing trade from lower-cost exporters that 
are not part of the community).  As noted above, in practice the ECOWAS zone 
suffers from numerous internal trade barriers, ranging from officially imposed 
trade bans to bribes extracted along major trade routes.  While both ECOWAS 
and UEMOA practice some degree of taxation of agricultural exports from 
outside the zone, the levels have historically been modest.  For example, the 
ECOWAS’s prelevement communautaire  (ad velorem tax) on rice imports from 
outside the zone stood at 0.5% in 2007, while the equivalent UEMOA tax stood 
at 1%.    
 
More recently, there have been calls for greater regional protection within the 
community to stimulate West African staple food production.  These calls have 
often framed in terms of promoting “food sovereignty” (Berthelot, 2006; Blein, 
2006) and are reminiscent of the calls in the 1980s for a “regional protected 
zone” for staples in West Africa. The basic argument is that some period of 
protection from outside competition is needed to spur investment in West African 
agriculture, presumably leading to cost-reducing technical change that will 
ultimately drive down food prices.  The “regional protected zone” proposal was 
widely debated in regional forums in the 1980s, led by CILSS and the Club du 
Sahel, and was ultimately abandoned for three reasons:  (a) concern about how 
higher staple food prices, at least in the short-run, would affect the large number 
of low-income consumers in the region; (b) lack of convincing evidence that 
higher prices in short run would lead to rapid adoption of cost-reducing technical 
change in agriculture given all the other constraints facing the agricultural sector 
(weak infrastructure, macro-economic constraints such as highly overvalued 
exchange rates, and weak agricultural research and extension systems), and (c) 
a lack of common interests from potential food exporting countries, such as Mali 
and Burkina Faso (which had interest in high food prices), and major food 
importers, such as Senegal (which had interest in low food prices).     15
 
Many of these same constraints still exist.  Furthermore, the democratization and 
increased urbanization that have occurred in most West African countries over 
the past 20 years have given poor urban consumers even greater voice in policy 
debates, making a heavily protected regional production zone less likely.   
However, with high transportation costs and rising world food prices, the region 
may become competitive vis-à-vis imports from the world market even without a 
high protective tariff.  Thus, the scope may be much greater now for creating a 
regional agricultural market that links production basins (some of which may 
span more than one country) to the region’s growing consumption centers.   
Examining the potential for such a market and the investments and policies 
needed to bring it about is an area that merits further research. 
 
3.. A WTO-style approach, based on open trade 
This approach, while often advocated as an ideal that allows countries to achieve 
food security at least cost by exploiting comparative advantage, has never been 
fully embraced by West African policy makers. Now with the collapse of the Doha 
round, a purely liberal approach to food security seems less likely than ever. The 
main complaint against this approach is well-known: a belief that the OECD 
countries stacked the rules of trade in their favor, with the result that the high-
income countries flooded West Africa with cheap agricultural goods (subsidized 
rice, powdered milk, etc.) and subsidized OECD producers (e.g., of cotton) that 
competed with African producers in third countries. While the current high world 
prices of agricultural commodities have reduced agricultural subsidies for the 
time being, policy makers remain wary of a completely open policy, especially in 
light of the recent restrictions on grain exports from major grain exporters such as 
India and Vietnam. 
 
Nonetheless, if physical availability of basic staples on international markets and 
reductions in OECD agricultural subsidies could be guaranteed, the advantages 
of a trade-based food security strategy remain attractive.  By focusing its 
resources in activities where they are most productive, a country and a region 
can obtain their basic food needs at lowest cost, rather than forcing poor 
consumers to pay high prices to support inefficient local production. Yet given all 
the constraints of moving to an equitable and reliable open international trading 
system, the immediate challenge is to discover paths that allow the West African 
countries to develop reliable food security strategies that don’t require a strong 
shift back towards autarky. As the example of North Korea shows, autarky is a 
very costly and seldom effective way to achieve food security.   
 
4..  Bilateral trade agreements within the context of regional economic 
communities 
Export bans, both by countries within ECOWAS and from Asian exporters, have 
undermined confidence in regional and international trade agreements.  Within 
ECOWAS, it is apparent that the need for national political leaders to protect 
consumers (many of them poor) trumps regional obligations to “free movement of   16
goods and people”, particularly in a low-income country such as Mali that fears 
that its neighbors can outbid it for its staple food supplies.  Thus, in the context of 
the trade bans, countries are increasingly looking to bilateral agreements to 
assure access to at least some food from the exporting countries.  These 
bilateral agreements often involve a quid pro quo on the part of the importer.  For 
example, Mali is offering its neighbors the opportunity to invest in its major 
irrigated rice area, the Office du Niger, which would presumably permit the 
investor countries (such as Senegal) the right to export the resulting production.  
The political advantage of such bilateral agreements is that they provide some 
“political recompense” to the exporting country in terms of being able to argue to 
its own consumers that food is not being exported without a compensating 
increase in national production.   
 
In addition, some West African countries are exploring bilateral trade agreements 
with food exporters from outside of West Africa.  For example, Senegal recently 
signed a 5-year agreement with India guaranteeing access to Indian rice exports.  
It is not apparent how such agreements will interact with regional agreements, 
such as the common agricultural policies of UEMOA and ECOWAS, which call 
for common external tariffs for imports from outside the communities.  Will the 
rice imported from India be subject to these tariffs? Once in Senegal, in principle, 
there would be no restrictions to its re-exportation to any country within the 
community.  Thus, has India really just signed an agreement with all of ECOWAS 
rather than with just Senegal?   
 
Which path(s) forward, and why? 
In the current high-price, post-Doha environment, what are the food-security 
options for West Africa?  One approach that may hold promise is that of a 
regional trade zone, with modest protection against import surges due to major 
exchange-rate fluctuations or export subsidies.  Such an approach would have 
the following advantages: 
 
  Wider regional markets will eliminate the small size of national markets 
(“thin markets”) that make them so volatile.  Regional integration will 
provide more price stability to both producers and consumers, and thus 
increase incentives for private investment in agriculture. It will also allow 
scale economies in marketing and processing. 
 
  A regional trade zone will permit the exploitation of ecological 
complementarities and comparative advantages  among countries--e.g., 
between the Sahel and coastal countries (Badiane and Resnick 2005)  
 
  The region provides the opportunity to pull research resources together 
and achieve scale economies in technology generation around different 
production basins, which often span national borders. 
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  The region can also allow the creation or strengthening of existing regional 
agricultural training centers. 
 
In principle, the regional approach described above sounds very much like the 
vision embraced by ECOWAS under NEPAD’s Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP).  But the history of regional trade 
agreements in West Africa has shown that moving from vision to reality is not 
easy.  In particular, overcoming the political pressures that restrict trade (both 
through trade bans and the persistence of non-tariff barriers) will require 
addressing the following questions: 
 
  Can trade policy alone protect the poor’s access to food without 
undermining incentives and resources to invest in agricultural productivity 
growth? If so, how? 
 
  What mix of national and regional trade, investment, and subsidy policies 
are politically feasible, financially sustainable, and most likely to lead to 
more food security in the West African context of porous borders and 
diverse national production, resource, consumption, and income patterns? 
 
  What policy changes are needed to transform the current high price 
environment into an opportunity to attract private investment including 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into agriculture?  Should West Africa adopt 
national or regional approaches to attract FDI into agricultural production 
(e.g., regional production basins)? 
 
  Is it possible to move to more predictable, rule-based food policy decision 
making at the national and regional levels?  If so, how?  Does West 
African experience (particularly with UEMOA) in making central bank 
actions politically independent, transparent, and rule-based provide a 
relevant model for food security decision making?  
 
  What are the appropriate domestic, regional, and international policy 
responses to the risks and uncertainty created in the global food markets 
by export bans?   
 
What we don’t know: implications for further research 
Responding to the above questions will depend not only on good political 
judgment but also on answers to key empirical questions that will help determine 
what is feasible and what would be the tradeoffs involved in different policy 
options.  The following empirical issues need to be addressed both at the 
regional level and in terms of variations by country and production basin:   
 
  What is the degree of substitution between imported and regionally 
produced food products (wheat and rice versus local “semi-tradables” like 
millet, sorghum and cassava)?   18
 
  To what degree have the higher prices been transmitted back to farmers 
as opposed to being captured by other actors in the value chains? Can we 
do better? 
 
  If world prices stay higher for the coming 10 years as projected by FAO, 
how is comparative advantage in producing different commodities going to 
be distributed among countries in West Africa? How competitive will be 
the regionally produced commodities vis-à-vis imported food items? 
 
  What are the major producing basins for staple crops in the region and 
what are the likely supply responses in those basins given the enduring 
high price environment? What are likely to be the major constraints to 
supply response? 
 
  Which among the technologies now available on the shelf are most likely 
to increase regional food supplies quickly? 
 
  What are the food assistance programs to the poor that are most 
compatible with improved production incentives?  19
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